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Abstract. In this paper, formal verification methodologies and the SPR (Safety
Problem Resolver) model checking tool are used for verifying a security model’s
safety. The SPR tool makes it possible to analyze security issues on security systems
based on the access control model. To illustrate this approach, a case study of the
Simple Access Control Model (SACM) is used and specific safety problems of the
security model are analyzed using the SPR tool.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The greater the assurance, the greater the confidence that a security system will
protect against threats, with an acceptable level of risk. A contrast is revealed in
supposedly secure commercial operating systems, applications, and network com-
ponents, particularly with respect to security. Commercial offerings have serious
security vulnerabilities. Most existing systems lack adequate ability to securely
interconnect and interoperate. Each vendor has taken a different approach, demon-
strating relative independence from their competitors. The revealing of all vul-
nerabilities comprises the goal of the security evaluation process. There is little
understanding as to the level of security that can be attained by integrating a col-
lection of components, and even less understanding as to what assurance security
may provide.
In the last decade, a number of individual countries developed specific secu-
rity evaluation standards [16]. This initiative opened the path to worldwide mu-
tual recognition of security evaluation results. Following this initiative, a new
Common Criteria (CC) [3] were developed. For example, CC defines seven le-
vels of assurance for security systems, rising from EAL1 to EAL7. In order to
obtain a higher assurance than EAL5, developers require specification of a se-
curity model for security systems and verify security using formal methods ap-
proach.
Vendors are discouraged from offering secure systems because significant re-
sources are required to develop a system capable of meeting the evaluation criteria
and to marshal it through the evaluation process. Moreover, because of evaluation
delays, an evaluated product is typically no longer the current version of the system,
which necessitates repeated reevaluation. For high assurance systems, the difficulty
of using formal methods adds further complexity to both development and evalu-
ation. However, given the lack of suitable mature, industrial-strength tools, and
the cost of formal verification, an informal approach generally presents a suitable
compromise.
This paper proposes a technique for analysis of security policy enforcement,
a framework for formal analysis of security systems, and Safety Problem Resolver
(SPR) [10]. These allow specification of system security-related elements and veri-
fication of system safety.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 addresses the classification of
security models and illustrates the background of issues. Section 3 introduces the
overall structure of the Safety Evaluation Workshop (SEW), in analyzing the safety
of a security model. Section 4 presents core specification and verification, illustrates
SPSL, and presents methods for resolving safety problems using the SPR tool. In
Section 5, an example of formal specification and verification for the Simple Access
Control Model (SACM) is presented using the SPR tool. Finally, Section 6 presents
the conclusion and discusses future direction.
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2 SAFETY PROBLEM
In general, security [14] represents the combination of confidentiality, integrity and
availability. The security model term [13] could be interpreted as the formal re-
presentation of a security system’s confidentiality, integrity and availability require-
ments. The more general usage of the term specifies a particular mechanism for
enforcing confidentiality and named access control, which has been adopted for
computer security from the world of documents and safes.
Security concerns arise in many different contexts; thus, many security mo-
dels have been developed. The access control model can be grouped into three
main classes according to security policies [6]: Discretionary Access Control (DAC),
Mandatory Access Control (MAC), and Role Based Access Control (RBAC).
Obtaining assurance that system behavior will not result in unauthorized access
is called a safety problem [13]. MAC governs access on the basis of classification
of subjects and objects in the system. MAC is safe by definition, and no safety
problem resolving is required for the MAC-based system, because safety for MAC
is proven theoretically and presented in a general case [12]. The verification of the
safety of any kind of MAC policy is obvious; however, unfortunately, the policies for
MAC are not particularly well suited to industry organizations that process sensitive
information.
DAC has the drawback that it does not provide real assurance on the flow of
information in a system. It is easy to bypass stated access restrictions, through
another user’s authorization process. For example, a user permitted to read data
can pass this data to other unauthorized users without the cognizance of usage of
information by a user once the user receives the information.
Since Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman demonstrated that the safety problem was
undecidable, in the common case [7], research has focused on determining whether
safety could be decided for access control models with limited, but practical, ex-
pressive power. First, the take-grant model has a linear time safety algorithm;
however, there is still a significant difference in expressive power between take-grant
and HRU [1]. This difference is considerably smaller for the models presented by
Sandhu et al.: SPM, TAM, ESPM, and non-monotonic ESPM [2]. Sandhu et al.
demonstrated that an access control model could be designed for which safety is
efficiently decidable (i.e., in polynomial time), given some restrictions. Ultimately,
despite proven expressive power and safety determination, these access control mo-
dels have not been adopted in practice. In this paper, we give two reasons for this
lack of acceptance:
1. subtlety of the restrictions and complex relationship and
2. difficulty in defining safety requirements and writing practical algorithms to
enforce these requirements.
With RBAC [5], access decisions are based on roles that individual users have
as part of an organization. Users take on assigned roles. In spite of the mentioned
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lacks, great majority of systems (e.g. operating systems, DBMS, Firewalls) use DAC-
based security models as the basis for access control mechanism. Thus, in a general
situation, safety cannot be verified for the arbitrary DAC access control system.
In security evaluation, safety verification is the central problem, particularly for
distributed computer systems.
In this paper, this safety problem is solved, proposing a universal specification
and model checking tool. This tool permits the analyzer to describe system security
elements and calculate security estimation for any security computer system.
3 SAFETY EVALUATION WORKSHOP
According to principles of computer system modeling, the term security model is
used as the combination of system security states, transitions through access control
rules, and constraints such as the state security criteria.
Figure 1 demonstrates three components of the formal security model. These
mainly present access control models [7, 12, 6]. The access control model was first
formulated by Lampson [11]. The structure of the model is that of a state machine
where each state is (S, O, M ), where S is a set of subjects, O is a set of objects,
and M is an access matrix which has one row for each subject, one column for each
object, and is such that cell M [s, o] contains the access rights.
Fig. 1. Security model structure
The type of security system mentioned in this paper, refers to operating systems,
IDSs, Firewalls, and so on. For safety evaluation of security systems, a Safety
Evaluation Workshop (SEW) structure is proposed, consisting of seven components.
Figure 2 presents the evaluation framework in SEW.
The functions of seven components in SEW are as follows:
1. System State Analyzer:
Investigates the system being evaluated and builds the security model state
automatically according to the access control model.
2. Security Criteria Manager:
Evaluator inputs the state security criteria into the Security Criteria Mana-
ger.
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Fig. 2. Safety Evaluation Workshop structure
3. Scopes:
(a) Model-related System Security (M3S) – scope:
Specifies the system security state and behavior in SPSL.
(b) Access Control Rules (ACR) – scope:
Describes access control rules in SPSL.
(c) State Security Criteria (SSC) – scope:
Expresses state security criteria in SPSL.
4. SPR:
Formal verification tool implemented using C and SWI-Prolog [17].
5. Safety Problem Specification Language (SPSL):
Specification language for security model with 3 scopes, based on Prolog
syntax.
6. Security Flow Explorer:
Demonstrates the sequence of the events, leading to the security fault.
7. Evaluation Reporter:
Produces a final report containing the access control model, system, initial
state, access control rules, security criteria, evaluation result, and security
flaw trace.
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4 SAFETY PROBLEM RESOLVING AND SPSL
4.1 General System
A general system Σ could be represented as a state machine: Σ = {SΣ, T, sΣ
init
, Q},
where SΣ is a set of system state; Q is the set of the queries executed by the
system, such as create file, read file or execute file; T is the state transition function,
T : Q×SΣ −→ SΣ moves the system from one state to another: a request q is issued
in the state sΣ
i
and moves the system to the next state sΣ





4.2 General Security Model
A general security model M presents an ensemble of sets, M = {S,R, C}, where
S is the set of system security states defined by the model; R is the set of the
access control rules; C is the set of the state security criteria in the form of logical
predicates c(s) defined on S and checking security of the state s. A state s ∈ S is
secure if and only if every security criterion c from C the predicate c(S) is true.
4.3 Safety Property
The term of safety means that “something bad never happens”. If a security system
has safety problem in security, it represents that sensitive information is leaked
by unauthorized access. The assurance that system behavior will not result in
unauthorized access is fundamental to ensuring that the enforcing of the access
control model will guarantee system security.
The system safety property can be formalized as Λ = {M,Σ, D}, where M is
the access control model, M = {S,R, C}; Σ is the system, Σ = {SΣ, T, sΣ
init
, Q};
D is the mapping function, D : SΣ −→ S, which is the relationship between the
system states and system security states.
4.4 SPSL
In order to specify the system security-related elements, in this paper the Safety
Problem Specification Language (SPSL) is presented. The majority of other work
relating to security specification is not intuitive and does not easily map onto tasks.
The ASL [9] represents an example technique based on the formal logic language
for security specification. Although support is provided for role-based access con-
trol, the language does not scale well in real systems because there is no method
of modeling real access control rules. There is no specification of delegation and no
method of modeling rules for groups of different identities. LaSCO [8] is a graphical
approach for evaluating security constraints on objects, in which the policy consists
of two components: domain (the system abstraction) and requirements (authoriza-
tion rules). The scope of this approach is excellent for plain demonstration, but too
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complex for actual implementation. The Ponder [4] language is an object-oriented
specification language. This language is most effective for safety specification and
evaluation purposes. This language is developed using JAVA implementation, but is
not well prepared for automated evaluation of real-world systems. The Ponder-based
system does not support system security state modifications and state transitions.
Therefore, this general evaluation problem for security policy enforcement, in-
cluding system weakness detection, has never been addressed by any security spec-
ification tools. SPSL represents a logical specification language to express a Model-
related System Security Scope (security states), Access Control Rules Scope (access
control rules), and Security Criteria Scope (security criteria) based on the Prolog-
style syntax (SWI-Prolog usage). SPSL is designed to specify the protection me-
chanisms of common-used operating systems such as Windows 2000 and Linux. For
example, consider the Windows 2000 operating system. In this system, system se-
curity is configured by subject (e.g., users, user groups), objects (e.g., files, registry
keys), and access control rights. The access control rights are composed in a list,
called the Access Control List (ACL). There is a map between subjects, objects,
and access modes in the ACL.
4.5 Safety Problem Resolving in SPR
In this paper, the Safety Problem Resolver (SPR) tool [10] is proposed, which helps
analyze and process SPSL-based specifications regarding the system security, veri-
fying whether a system security policy has a safety problem. The SPR verifies an
initial system security state using a given security criteria; first all reachable states
are generated, then they are verified using the criteria. The SPR tool is a logi-
cal machine based on the Prolog kernel, supplied with an API implemented in the
C++ programming language. The SPR can be applied to safety problem resolving
as described below.
For analyzing safety problems using SPR, it is necessary to execute three stages.
1. Evaluate whether the given initial system sΣ
init
∈ sΣ state conforms to the secu-
rity criteria C:
∀c ∈ C : c(D(sΣ
init
)) = true.

















i+1) and ∀r ∈ R : r(si, si+1) = true.
3. Generate the states sΣ
i
∈ sΣ reachable from the given initial state sΣ
init
∈ sΣ and
analyze their safety by the security criteria C:
∀sΣ
i
∈ SΣ : sΣ
i






) : ∀c ∈ C : c(si) = true.
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If the above conditions are met, the system in the given system state is safe
according to the access control model. The process of producing sets of reachable
states and evaluating the criteria is called safety problem resolving.
The SPR tool searches all reachable states in systems and verifies whether they
represent an unsafe security state. A more detailed description of the SPR is pre-
sented in [15].
5 SECURITY EVALUATION EXAMPLE
For easy understanding of security specification and SPR’s functionality, a very









High Group Low Group 
Fig. 3. Simple Access Control Model example
The access control model presented in Figure 3 has High and Low groups. Sub-
ject1, Subject2, Object1 and Object2 are in the High group. Subject3 and Object3
are involved in the Low group. In this example, a Subject refers to a user, and
an Object points to a file. This example access control model should satisfy the
following safety properties.
1. No Read Up: A subject is allowed read access to an object only if the access
class of the object dominates the access class of the subject.
2. No Write Down: A subject is allowed write access to an object only if the access
class of the subject is dominated by the access class of the object.
The satisfaction of these principles prevents information in high level objects to
flow to objects at lower levels.
5.1 Security States
The security states are a collection of all entities of the system (subjects, objects)
and their security attributes (access rights, ACLs, and etc.), similar to well-known
operating system. In this example model, it is assumed that a subject has each















High Group read,write read,write read,write
Low Group read,write
Subject1 read,write read,write read,write
Subject2 read,write read,write read
Subject3 read,write
Table 1. Simple Access Control Model’s ACLs
object in its directory. The SACM includes user groups and files. User groups
are divided into High and Low ones and are noted as security subjects. Subject1,
Subject2 and Subject3 represent three users. File system elements(files and direc-
tories) are regarded as security objects. Object1, Object2 and Object3 are noted as
3-scope files in each user’s directory. The object access by subject depends on the
ACLs shown in Table 1. The system security states may be presented in terms of
Model-related System Security Scope (M3S)-scope; Subjects + Objects + Security
Attributes.












low, s1(rd,rp,wd,wp), s2(rp,rd,wd,wp), s3]).
Example 1 presents some components of M3S-scope in SPSL. According to the
form of M3S-scope mentioned above, SACM’s initial security state using SPSL is
specified based on Figure 3 and Table 1. This consists of three elements;
• Subjects and their membership in the group (e.g., subjectGroups).
• Objects and their hierarchy (e.g., objectType and objectOwner).
• Initial values of the subjects’ and objects’ security attributes (e.g., subjectAttr,
subject, objectAttr and object).
Predicate subjectAttr represents a subject’s security attribute. Attribute sub-
jectGroups depicts user membership in the groups. Thus, the statement ‘subject-
Attr(subjectGroups)’ in the first line means to create a new type of subjectGroups.
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With a predicate subject declared as an initial set of the subjects in the SACM.
The predicate subject represents two parameters, the name of the subject and its
attribute values. For example, the statement ‘subject(s1,[subjectGroups(high)])’ in
the second line means that “s1 is a subject in a high group”. With predicate object-
Attr, a set of the objects security attributes is declared. The objectType attribute
in the Prolog list of predicates depicts the type of objects and is generally used to
distinguish whether the object is a file or directory. Attribute objectOwner describes
the owner of object.
Then, there are five attributes with names of users and groups. In a predicate
object, an initial set of objects are declared in SACM. The predicate object has two
parameters, name of the object and its attribute values. Therefore, the 12th line in
Example 1 can be interpreted as follows: “The object of o1 is a file. The owner
of object o1 is s1. The high group has an access permission right of rp, rd, wd,
wp to o1. The low group possesses no access rights to o1. The subject of s1 pos-
sesses access rights of rd, rp, wd, wp to o1. The subject of s2 possesses access
rights of rd, rp, wd, wp to o1. The subject of s3 has no access rights to o1.”
The privilege rd allows reading directory entries such as listing files and subdirec-
tories. The function of rd, rp, wd, and wp privileges is presented in Section 5.2.
The object states of o2 and o3 are not described because it is trivial to obtain
the associated SPSL code from Table 1, Figure 3, and the example of the o1 ob-
ject.
Using a similar structure, any real system securable object can be specified.
In order to automate this approach a special tool has been developed, e.g., State
Analyzer for Windows, that investigates the system and creates the system security
state.
5.2 Access Control Rules
Access control rules express the restrictions on system behavior. System state trans-
formation is possible after access is authorized by the system reference monitor
(access control mechanism). Authorization is checked against the security policy
requirements represented using access control rules. In the SACM example, a sub-
ject can have actions rd, rp, wd or wp. The rd command allows reading directory
entries, i.e., listing of files and reading data stored in file. The rp command al-
lows reading a files privileges. The wd command allows file creation in a directory.
The wp command allows modification of a files privileges of the file. Such speci-
fication can be called Access Control Rules (ACR)-scope. Example 2 shows some
components ACR-scope of SACM. Due to space and coverage limitations in this
paper, full ACR related information is not described in SPSL. In fact, it is ne-
cessary to investigate a number of manuals, specifications, APIs, and vulnerability
exploits to obtain ACR-scope for analyzing real operating systems such as Windows
2000.
Formal Verification of Security Model Using SPR Tool 363

































The SPSL source code shown above can be divided into two categories: The first
is for security policy requirements, and the second defines predicate prototypes for
checking security criteria. With the predicate validPermission, access permission R
defined in ACLs can be expressed. Predicate isGroupMember which verifies S (sub-
ject) is a member of G (group). The isFile predicate tests whether O (object) is
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a file. The predicate canReadFile verifies that S (subject) can read from file O.
Similarly, canWriteFile verifies that S (subject) can write to file O. Predicates
TestState1 and TestState2 predicates represent security criteria clauses for secu-
rity policy requirement. TestState1 depicts “No Read Up” policy and TestState2
denotes “No Write Down” policy.
5.3 Security Criteria
The security criteria allows a customer or evaluator to verify the secure and insecure
states in a security model. The security criteria have a form of constraints which
state the necessary conditions of the secure system. The system is safe if
⋂
i∈N cri =
true, where cri is an undesirable state criterion. The notation of cri is the negation
of cri. In other words, cri which means an unsafe state should not be found in a
security model. The SPR tool’s security criteria can be represented as State Security
Criteria (SSC)-scope. Example 3 demonstrates SSC-scope of the SACM written in
SPSL.
Example 3. SSC-scope of SACM
testState1(_,_). testState2(_,_).
Two predicates, testState1( , ) and testState2( , ) call the criterion predicate
shown in Example 2. In Prolog language, ‘ ’ means the sign of an anonymous
variable.
5.4 Safety Evaluation Results Processing
SPR input with triple scopes(M3S-scope, ACR-scope, and SSC-scope) are written in
SPSL. The executable program for SACM is then executed. During execution, two
files are created: the security logical deduction trace (SRP.TRC) and the evaluation
report (SPR.REP). Example 4 presents the SPR.TRC file for SACM. With regard
to space considerations, only the shorter traces are shown. This raw format content
represents Prolog backtracking traces.
Example 4. SPR.TRC of SACM
3 call system:not(testState1(_G7, _G8))
4 call testState1(_G7,_G8)
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Example 5. SPR.REP of SACM
/*
* SPR report file




Example 5 presents the output of file SPR.REP. The result for checking the
testState1 criteria is “succeeded”. This means there is no subject in the low group,
which can read objects in the high group. The evaluation verdict for testState2 is
“failed”, i.e. the SACM initial state is unsafe. After analyzing this unsafe state, s1
in High group can be found to have an access right permission of wd, wp to o1 in
a low group. The incorrect setting of ACLs for subjects and objects permits the
SACM to violate associated security requirements. For the safety of the SACM,
Subject1 is set to only have read permission for Object3. The modified predicate




In this paper, we addressed formal specification and verification approach for a se-
curity model. The SPR model checking tool and its associated method for safety
problem reasoning have been presented. The tool permits verification of safety pro-
perties in terms of the security model, based on the security scope. After conducting
the case study of analyzing safety problems in the SACM, the SPR tool is confirmed
to be useful for security system customers and evaluators, because these kinds of
tools are rare in the security field. The targets of this application include computer
systems based on state machine presentation: operating systems, DBMSs and Fire-
walls. The current versions of these tools are aimed at well-known systems such
as Microsoft Windows NT series and UNIX based systems. For future work, the
SEW components including System State Analyzer, Security Criteria Manager, and
Security State Explorer will be developed to support straightforward modeling and
analysis for system security and safety problems.
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